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aBStraCt: in its September 13th 2017 decision,1 the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) decided on a request for a preliminary ruling by the Supreme Court of 
Poland (Sąd Najwyższy) in proceedings between ENEa S.a. (ENEa) and the presi-
dent of the Urzędu regulacji Energetyki (office for the regulation of energy, UrE) on 
the imposition by the latter of a financial penalty on ENEa for breach of its obligation 
to supply electricity produced by cogeneration. The judgment of the Court of Justice 
follows many decisions of the European Commission and judgments of the EU courts 
assessing the involvement of State resources in support schemes in energy, particu-
larly with the aim of switching towards more environmentally friendly sources. This 
case reaffirms that support schemes may, in certain circumstances, fall outside the 
scope of the EU State aid rules.
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Introduction
The 2030 Framework for Climate and Energy2 defines EU-wide targets for 
achieving a more competitive, secure and sustainable energy system and 
to meet Europe’s long-term objective of a low carbon economy. a target to 
* Phd Candidate, Católica research Centre for the Future of law, Católica Global School of 
law, Universidade Católica Portuguesa, 1649-023, lisbon, Portugal; researcher, Foundation for 
Science and technology (FCt), Portugal.
1 Judgment of 13 September 2017, ENEA S.A. v. Prezes Urzędu Regulacji Energetyki, C-329/15, 
EU:C:2017:671.
2 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the regions, a policy framework for cli-
mate and energy in the period from 2020 to 2030, CoM/2014/015 final. 
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achieve by 2030 is a 27% share of renewable energy in Europe’s final energy 
consumption.3 one of the main mechanisms to help attain national and 
European renewables objectives is support schemes for renewable energy 
sources. Since the market itself, due to market and regulatory failures,4 
does not provide the optimal level of renewables, public intervention is 
necessary.5 in regulated sectors and especially in the energy sector, there 
is a long historical tradition of public intervention. as the objectives in the 
sectors change, the impact of regulation on the market’s functioning and 
on how investors participate in the market is more evident. to support 
the production and supply of electricity from renewable sources, EU level 
and national level measures can be implemented. EU level measures to 
promote renewable energy might include for example requiring Member 
States to provide priority access to electricity networks regarding electric-
ity produced from renewable sources,6 but Member States are encour-
aged to plan and enable their own schemes for electricity generation from 
renewable sources.7 as determined by the renewable Energy directive, 
“support scheme” means “any instrument, scheme or mechanism applied 
by a Member State or a group of Member States, that promotes the use of 
energy from renewable sources by reducing the cost of that energy, increas-
ing the price at which it can be sold, or increasing, by means of a renew-
able energy obligation or otherwise, the volume of such energy purchased. 
This includes, but is not restricted to, investment aid, tax exemptions or 
3 “EU Member States (MS) have already put energy and climate policies in place to reach their 
individual rES targets for 2020 and are now in the process of setting additional national objectives 
for the 2030 perspective”, directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
23 april 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and 
subsequently repealing directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, oJ l 140, 5.6.2009, 16-62. 
4 Such as low levels of competition and unfair competition with other fuels, in particular subsidies 
for fossil fuels and nuclear energy, the incomplete internalization of external costs rigid electricity 
system design inhibit the growth of renewable energy.
5 in order to address market distortions that may result from public support granted to renewable 
energy sources, the European Commission has issued new Guidelines on State aid for environ-
mental protection and energy 2014-2020, which define common rules for a market-based support 
for renewable energy. 
6 Penttinen, Sirja-leena, and Kim talus, “development of the sustainability aspects of EU energy 
policy”, SSRN Scholarly Paper. rochester, NY: Social Science research Network, July 6, 2014. 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2472863.
7 directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 april 2009 on the 
promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing 
directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, oJ l 140, 5.6.2009, 16 (hereinafter the renewable Energy 
directive).
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reductions, tax refunds, renewable energy obligations, support schemes 
including those using green certificates, and direct price support schemes 
including feed-in tariffs and premium payments”.8 These schemes are a 
means for Member States to reach their national targets and may be the 
result as well of cooperation with other Member States or third countries. 
Since the intervention of the State is seen as necessary, States need to be 
mindful of the fact that undertakings may gain an advantage over com-
petitors, which can trigger concerns regarding the compatibility with EU 
State aid rules. Under article 107 of the treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (tFEU), all State aid measures are prohibited unless 
explicitly authorized following prior notification by the Member State con-
cerned. Non-notified aid is deemed unlawful and as such must be recov-
ered from the beneficiaries by the Member State. However, State aid may 
be compatible with the internal market under articles 107(2) and (3) of the 
treaty under certain circumstances.
as public intervention can take different forms, the case at issue concerns 
a support scheme for electricity produced by cogeneration.  Cogeneration 
(Combined Heat and Power or CHP) is the simultaneous production 
of electricity and heat, both of which are used.9 Producing electricity 
by cogeneration is therefore “a means to secure energy savings ranging 
between 15-40% when compared to the supply of electricity and heat from 
conventional power stations and boilers”.10  
Facts of the case
The dispute in the main proceedings concerns a support scheme for 
electricity produced by cogeneration provided for by the Polish law on 
Energy.11 Companies selling electricity to end users were required that, for 
the period ranging from1 January 2003 to 1 July 2007, a quota of their total 
sales of electricity to end users be produced by cogeneration. The quota 
8 article 2(k) of the renewable Energy directive.
9 definition from www.cogeneurope.eu, accessed 28 January 2018.
10 definition from www.cogeneurope.eu, accessed 28 January 2018.
11 article 9a (8) of the law on energy (Ustawa Prawo Energetyczne in Polish) of 10 april 1997 states:
“an electricity undertaking engaged in the production of or trading in electricity and the sale 
of that electricity to end users connected to the network within the republic of Poland shall be 
required, to the extent described in paragraph 10, to purchase [electricity produced by cogenera-
tion] offered to it from energy sources connected to the network and situated in the republic of 
Poland”.
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could be achieved by production of CHP within the undertaking itself or 
the purchase of such electricity by third party producers.
The company involved in the proceedings, ENEa, a Polish State-owned 
company, did not comply with the quota set for the year 2006,12 which 
resulted on a fine imposed by the President of the office for the regulation 
of Energy13 on 27 November 2008. ENEa appealed the decision of the 
administrative body in first instance, where the case was dismissed, and 
on appeal where the financial penalty was reduced but the claim dismissed 
as to the other claims. Finally, the case was appealed before the Supreme 
Court of Poland, the referring court. 
Before the Supreme Court, the company raised for the first time the 
claim that the imposition constituted State aid and as such must have 
been communicated to the European Commission. ENEa claimed that 
the measure, since it had not been notified, was unlawful, consequentially 
the financial penalty as well. The referring court, in its assessment, found 
that the measure met the conditions of a selective advantage, resulting 
in a possible distortion of competition or effect trade between Member 
States. While the Court took the view that the obligation was attributable 
to the State, it was not certain whether there was intervention through 
State resources.
as the referring court saw it necessary to seek from the Court of Justice 
an interpretation of its case law, it referred three preliminary questions to 
the Court of Justice:
“1. Must article 107 tFEU be interpreted as meaning that the obliga-
tion to purchase [electricity produced by cogeneration] as laid down in 
[the national provisions] constitutes State aid?
2. if the answer to the first question is affirmative, is article 107 tFEU 
to be interpreted to the effect that an energy undertaking treated as an 
emanation of a Member State, and bound to perform the obligation 
classified as State aid, may in proceedings before a national court rely 
upon infringement of that provision?
3. if the answers to the first two questions are affirmative, is article 107 
tFEU, read with article 4(3) tEU, be interpreted as meaning that the 
non-compliance with article 107 tFEU of the obligation arising from 
12 For the year 2006 the minimum consisted of 15%, as set by the regulation adopted by the 
Minister of Economy and labour on 9 december 2004.
13 Prezes Urzędu regulacji Energetyki.
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national law means that a financial penalty may not be imposed on an 
undertaking that has failed to perform that obligation?”14
Judgment
The Court started its decision-making by tackling the first question, as the 
second and third questions were asked on the condition that the answer to 
the first question be affirmative. 
in order for a measure to be classified as State aid, as provided by article 
107(1) tFEU, four conditions15 need to be met: (i) intervention by the State 
or through State resources, which (ii) can affect trade between Member 
States and (iii) confer a selective advantage on the beneficiary, which (iv) 
could distort or threaten to distort competition. Since the referring Court 
had formulated the view that three of these conditions had been met, the 
Court found it necessary to reformulate the first question as “whether 
article 107(1) tFEU must be interpreted as meaning that a national meas-
ure […] placing an obligation on both private and public undertakings to 
purchase electricity produced by cogeneration constitutes intervention by 
the State or through State resources”.16
in order to assess whether the advantage had been given “by a Member 
State or through State resources”, the Court reiterated the importance of 
determining the involvement of the public authorities in the adoption of 
the measure at issue, stating that for it to be possible to classify the measure 
as State aid, first, it must be attributable to the State and be granted directly 
or indirectly through State resources.17 
The Court took the view that the advantage granted was attributable to 
the Member State as the obligation was provided for under the law on 
Energy and, therefore, introduced through a legal provision.  Concerning 
the interpretation of the intervention of the State, the Court started by reit-
erating its jurisprudence that the aid may be granted directly by the State, 
14 Judgment of 13 September 2017, ENEA S.A. v. Prezes Urzędu Regulacji Energetyki, C-329/15, 
EU:C:2017:671.
15 The Court has referred to these conditions in previously established judgments, such as in 
Judgement of 19 december 2013, Association Vent de Colère and Others, C-262/12, EU:C:2013:851, 
paragraph 15.
16 Judgment of 13 September 2017, ENEA S.A. v. Prezes Urzędu Regulacji Energetyki, C-329/15, 
EU:C:2017:671, paragraph 9.
17 as previously established in the judgments of 16 May 2002, France v. Commission, C-482/99, 
EU:C:2002:294, paragraph 24, and of 19 december 2013, Association Vent de Colère and Others, 
C-262/12, EU:C:2013:851, paragraph 16.
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but also by State-designated or established private bodies whose purpose 
is to administer the aid.18 This interpretation of article 107(1) tFEU makes 
it possible for different financial means by which public authorities may 
support companies, irrespective of whether they are permanent assets of 
the public sector, to be considered State resources. However, it is necessary 
to distinguish between a measure under public control and available to the 
competent national authorities at all times, and one that does not bind the 
company to anything but to purchase using their own financial resources, 
making no use of State resources. 
The measure at issue in the main proceedings requires from undertak-
ings 15% of the annual electricity sold to final users to come from electric-
ity produced by cogeneration. The President of the UrE has the right to 
impose a financial liability to the companies that do not comply with their 
obligation. apart from setting the above-mentioned obligation, the Polish 
State intervened on the market by determining a maximum price for the 
sale of electricity to final users in order for the undertakings not to pass on 
to end users the extra cost imposed by the purchase obligation. as a result 
of the measure imposed on the undertakings, the electricity suppliers 
would at time be obliged to purchase electricity produced by cogeneration 
at a higher price than the one paid by the end users. The price would not 
be subject to a lower threshold and the purchase price would be decided by 
the parties concerned in the transaction. according to the settled case law 
in Essent Network Noord and others19 will be regarded as aid “measures 
which, whatever their form, are likely directly or indirectly to favour cer-
tain undertakings or are to be regarded as an economic advantage which 
the recipient undertaking would not have obtained under normal market 
conditions”.20 
The added costs from purchasing electricity at a higher price intend-
ing to comply with the quota set by the purchase obligation are neither 
to be passed on to end users nor financed “by a compulsory contribution 
imposed by the State or by a full offset mechanism”.21 The Court also reiter-
18 Judgment of the Court of 13 September 2017, ENEA S.A. v. Prezes Urzędu Regulacji Energetyki, 
C-329/15, EU:C:2017:671, paragraph 23.
19 Judgment of 17 July 2008, Essent Netwerk Noord and Others, C-206/06, EU:C:2008:413, para-
graph 79.
20 Judgment of 17 July 2008, Essent Netwerk Noord and Others, C-206/06, EU:C:2008:413, para-
graph 79.
21 Judgment of 13 September 2017, ENEA S.A. v. Prezes Urzędu Regulacji Energetyki, C-329/15, 
EU:C:2017:671, paragraph 30.
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ated also the views expressed by the advocate General in his opinion that 
the measure does not appoint undertakings to manage a State resource. 
ENEa was bound to comply with the obligation under the law on Energy 
and was utilizing its financial resources to fulfil that obligation. 
ENEa and the European Commission also raised the claim that the 
purchase obligation was imposed mostly on public undertakings and as 
such the obligation could be classified as through State resources. in their 
claim they further stated that “the undertakings controlled by the Polish 
Government held more than 80% of the market share in the sale of elec-
tricity to final users and bought more than 85% of the electricity produced 
from cogeneration”.22 on this claim the Court reiterated23 its already 
established view that the resources of public undertakings may be clas-
sified as State resources in those cases where the State is able to influence 
or direct the use of said resources in order to finance advantages to the 
benefit of other undertakings.24 despite ENEa’s capital being State-owned, 
the company acted no different than any other entity of private capital, as 
shown by the fact that it rejected offers for sale due to the excessive price 
and that it had signed contracts which would have helped it achieve the set 
quota. Furthermore, the obligation imposed by the law was imposed to 
all electricity suppliers, whether State owned or owned by private entities. 
in conclusion, despite the fact that the measure is attributable to the 
Member State concerned, it does not derive therefrom that the Member 
State exercises an overriding influence over an undertaking in which it is 
the majority shareholder.25 The Court did not find elements in the docu-
ments submitted, nor during the hearings, to sustain that the State had exer-
cised a dominant influence as a majority shareholder in an undertaking.
accordingly, the answer to the first question is that article 107(1) tFEU 
must be interpreted as meaning that a national measure, such as that at 
issue in the main proceedings, placing an obligation on both private and 
public undertakings to purchase electricity produced by cogeneration 
does not constitute intervention by the State or through State resources. 
22 advocate General’s opinion, paragraph 90. 
23 Judgment of 16 May 2002, France v. Commission, C-482/99, EU:C:2002:294, paragraph 38.
24 Judgment of 13 September 2017, ENEA S.A. v. Prezes Urzędu Regulacji Energetyki, C-329/15, 
EU:C:2017:671, paragraph 31.
25 The Court has already interpreted the law and expressed its views on the matter in Judgment of 
16 May 2002, France v. Commission, C-482/99, EU:C:2002:294.
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Concerning the second and third, since the Court answers negatively to 
the first question, it cannot answer the other two questions. 
Conclusion
For the first time ever since PreussenElektra and after trial and error, it 
seems that a Member State has managed to design a State aid-compli-
ant legal measure for funding and supporting the change towards more 
environmentally friendly sources and mixes. Furthermore, it seems that 
this decision might be signaling a slight shift towards a more commit-
ted involvement of the State, such as a transfer of State resources and the 
link between treasury and the advantage. despite this being a contribu-
tion to the interpretation of State resources, the decision differing from the 
opinion of the advocate General is not as detailed in its interpretation and 
as such it is valuable for a complete understanding of the case to take into 
consideration the analysis of the advocate General.26  
among the conditions for a measure to be classified as State aid, art. 107 
tFEU provides that the measure must have been “granted by a Member 
State or through State resources”. The wording of the article, “or” (alter-
native), may make it appear as if not implying a cumulative requirement 
for a measure to qualify as State aid. However, in its established case law 
the Court of Justice has clarified that in addition to the involvement of 
State resources, the measure must be attributable, or “imputable”, to the 
State. The reasoning of both the Court and the advocate General in this 
case seems to point to a narrower interpretation of the two layered State 
resources criterion. He stresses the need for an actual transfer of State 
resources and control to be exerted, rather than only having majority 
shareholding.27 Furthermore, majority shareholding, in his view, is not 
sufficient to conclude that there has been involvement of State resources. 
The interpretation of State resources has been broad in order to leave little 
room for a finding of no State resources and therefore no aid. The decision 
seems to point that maybe this cannot be applied for the cases where the 
State has provided for a framework but not for the mechanisms, especially 
in cases of transitioning towards environmentally friendly energy sources. 
26 opinion of advocate General Saugmandsgaard ØE, Case C-329/15, ENEA SA w Poznaniu v. 
Prezes Urzędu Regulacji Energetyki, EU:C:2017:233.
27 in the Stardust Marine case, which will be discussed further below, the Court of Justice had pre-
viously ruled that “for advantages to be capable of being categorized as State aid, they must, first, 
be granted directly or indirectly through State resources, and, second, be imputable to the State”. 
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The parties have claimed that the circumstances of the case under 
consideration are comparable to those which gave rise to the Court’s 
pronouncements in Essent Netwerk, association Vent de Colère and 
PreussenElektra. The aG drew a comparison between the case in the main 
proceedings with PreussenElektra,28  in which the obligation imposed on 
private electricity-supply undertakings to buy electricity from renewable 
energy sources at minimum fixed prices did not, in the Court’s opinion, 
involve a direct or indirect transfer of State resources to the undertakings 
producing that electricity. 
PreussenElektra aG (PreussenElektra), an undertaking operating con-
ventional fossil fuel and nuclear power plants in Germany, was a majority 
shareholder and almost exclusive supplier for Schleswag aG (Schleswag), a 
regional electricity supplier. Schleswag was required by German legislation 
to purchase electricity from renewable energy sources produced within 
its supply area at a fixed minimum price.29 The additional costs resulting 
from the legal obligation were regulated by a compensation mechanism. 
The case came to the Court as a result of the request for preliminary rul-
ing by the regional Court asking for an interpretation of article 107 and 
whether the Member State legislation constituted State aid. The Court took 
the view that the purchase obligation did not involve any direct or indirect 
transfer of State resources, which is a necessary element for the measure to 
be considered State aid under EU law.30 Furthermore, the financial burden 
the undertakings were subject to as a result of the purchase obligation was 
viewed as a characteristic of feed-in tariffs and “does not constitute an 
advantage for the producers of electricity at the expense of the State”.31 The 
support scheme was established through a legal provision, but financed by 
private undertakings. 
in relation to the Court finding whether the measure could be classified 
as State aid due to the involvement of State resources, PreussenElektra and 
doux Élevage are particular, as State involvement had been very limited. 
The doux Élevage case raised the question whether obligatory contribu-
tions to an inter-trade organization could be classified as State resources.32 
The Court of Justice held that they did not involve any direct or indirect 
28 Judgment of 13 March 2001, PreussenElektra, C-379/98, EU:C:2001:160, paragraphs 17 to 22 and 56.
29 Judgment of 13 March 2001, PreussenElektra, C-379/98, EU:C:2001:160, paragraphs 17-19. 
30 Judgment of 13 March 2001, PreussenElektra, C-379/98, EU:C:2001:160, paragraph 59.
31 Judgment of 13 March 2001, PreussenElektra, C-379/98, EU:C:2001:160, paragraph 62.
32 Judgment of 30 May 2013, Doux Élevage SNC, C677/11, EU:C:2013:348.
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transfer of State resources since the sums deriving from the obligatory 
contributions did not go through the State budget or through another pub-
lic body and the State did not incur any losses or gains from exercising any 
control on the contributions. 
ENEa and the Commission presented the argument that due to the 
majority participation of the Polish State in ENEa and several other elec-
tricity providers, the reasoning in PreussenElektra did not apply in this 
case. to support that argument the parties related to the findings of the 
court in the Stardust Marine judgment.33 in the Stardust Marine case, 
the Court developed the criterion of “having been involved”.34 Stardust 
Marine, a French company operating in the leisure-boat market and 
financed through loans and guarantees by SBt-Batif, incurred financial 
difficulties in 1994.35 By conversion of debt into capital, the undertaking 
eventually became under control of the Crédit lyonnais group, which was 
principally owned and supported by the French State. The case came to 
the Court of Justice as the French government appealed a Commission 
decision which assessed the capital increases injected into Stardust Marine 
as State aid. regarding imputability of the measure to the State, the most 
important contribution of this case is that the Court of Justice held that 
the exercise of the control and dominant influence into the operations of 
the undertaking cannot be presumed by the fact that the State might hold 
the shares necessary to exercise it.  The control of the resources by the State 
and the imputability of the measure to the State are two necessary criteria 
to establish the concept of transfer of State resources.36 
The Court explicitly said in Stardust Marine that “such an interpretation 
of the condition that, for a measure to be capable of being classified as State 
aid within the meaning of article 87(1) EC, it must be imputable to the 
State, which infers such imputability from the mere fact that that measure 
was taken by a public undertaking, cannot be accepted. Even if the State 
is in a position to control a public undertaking and to exercise a dominant 
influence over its operations, actual exercise of that control in a particu-
lar case cannot be automatically presumed. a public undertaking may act 
33 Judgment of 16 May 2002, France v. Commission (Stardust Marine), C-482/99, EU:C:2002:294.
34 Judgment of 16 May 2002, France v. Commission (Stardust Marine), C-482/99, EU:C:2002:294, 
paragraph 52.
35 The situation was a result of fraud, poor commercial strategy, inappropriate management and 
several unexpected losses.
36 Judgment of 16 May 2002, France v. Commission (Stardust Marine), C-482/99, EU:C:2002:294, 
paragraph 54.
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with more or less independence, according to the degree of autonomy left 
to it by the State. […] Therefore, the mere fact that a public undertaking is 
under State control is not sufficient for measures taken by that undertak-
ing, such as the financial support measures in question here, to be imputed 
to the State”.37 despite the fact that both in Stardust Marine and in the 
present case the State was the majority shareholder in the undertaking, 
in Stardust Marine the State had used the undertaking as its “financial 
arm”.38 
The findings in Stardust Marine are important to support the view that 
majority shareholding does not imply imputability, and also the difficulty 
to prove “on the basis of a precise inquiry, that in the particular case the 
public authorities specifically incited the public undertaking to take the 
aid measures in question. in the first place, having regard to the fact that 
relations between the State and public undertakings are close, there is a 
real risk that State aid may be granted through the intermediary of those 
undertakings in a non-transparent way and in breach of the rules on State 
aid laid down by the treaty. Moreover, it will, as a general rule, be very dif-
ficult for a third party, precisely because of the privileged relations existing 
between the State and a public undertaking, to demonstrate in a particular 
case that aid measures taken by such an undertaking were in fact adopted 
on the instructions of the public authorities”.39 
The advocate General in ENEa also distinguished among the circum-
stances of Essent and Vent de Colère with the circumstances that gave 
rise to the case in the main proceedings. He clarified that in the case, in 
the main proceedings the intervention of the State is limited and there 
is no financing mechanism used for the collection of compulsory contri-
butions.40 in Essent, one of the main drivers for the Court’s decision was 
that the funds were raised through a levy that posed a financial burden 
for the users and had been established by a decision of the dutch gov-
ernment. Furthermore distributors operating under instructions by the 
37 Judgment of 16 May 2002, France v. Commission (Stardust Marine), C-482/99, EU:C:2002:294, 
paragraphs 51-52.
38 “it would in my view go too far to classify autonomous decisions of public undertakings and 
other entities distinct from public authorities automatically as State measures”. opinion of 
advocate General Jacobs, 13 december 2001, Case C-482/99, EU:C:2001:685, paragraph 55.
39 Judgment of 16 May 2002, France v. Commission (Stardust Marine), C-482/99, EU:C:2002:294, 
paragraphs 53-54. 
40 opinion of advocate General Saugmandsgaard ØE, ENEA SA w Poznaniu v. Prezes Urzędu 
Regulacji Energetyki, Case C-329/15, EU:C:2017:233, paragraph 107. 
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dutch government were tasked with managing the funds, which meant 
that the State had exercised control over the latter. The circumstances in 
Vent de Colère differ, as in ENEa the maximum price is fixed with the 
intent to limit the ability for the providers to pass on the extra cost, instead 
of it being offset.41  
another element that the Court did not tackle in its decision was the 
intention of the measure. The lack of the minimum price is seen as weak-
ening the selective advantage, but at the same time the intention of the 
measure was to increase the demand for a certain product that would not 
have been achieved if left under normal market conditions. This interven-
tion resulted in an increase of both the sales and the sale price of the prod-
uct, as well as in the strengthening of the position of the producers. The 
advocate General, in his opinion, deduced that “by altering normal mar-
ket conditions in favour of the producers of electricity by cogeneration, the 
supply obligation confers on the latter an advantage within the meaning of 
article 107(1) tFEU”.42
The Court of Justice decided that the advantage granted to producers of 
electricity by cogeneration was not granted directly or indirectly through 
State resources. an important contribution of the decision in this case is 
that, in its assessment, the Court expressed clearly that there is a difference 
between the role of the State as a legislator and the role of the State as a 
shareholder. Ever since PreussenElektra, Member States have been looking 
for the holy grail of mechanisms design to help them pass the State aid test. 
it remains to be seen if this development will mean that the Polish legisla-
tor has found the loophole that has been searched for so long. 
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